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ROBERTStt

"JUSTICE MUST NOT only be done, but should manifestly and
"undoubtedly
be seen to be done."' For the image of the law, like
the image of any activity and its practitioners, has an influence upon
its viability; a reciprocity exists between the law and the society ordered
by the law, other than that described in statute and decision. The
determinants of a public image, whether of law or religion, education,
politics, medicine, business or marriage, art or poetry, are difficult to
define; and the weight of any element among them defies measurement
in precise terms. One element, however, can be examined for the
direction of its influence upon the public image of law and lawyers,
though its weight, probably more than negligible, cannot be empirically
evaluated. That is, the portrait offered in literature often has a compelling, affecting, and evocative force; and if various literary works
are more often encountered than are lawyers and the courts, it may be
reasonably suspected that the former play a considerable part in the
formation of the image. In short, what is "seen to be done" is seen
through filters, naive or sophisticated, folk or fine, and if not the
* This is the first of a series of studies exploring the image of the law and
the lawyer.
t Assistant Professor of English, Villanova University. A.B. 1952, M.A. 1954,
University of Notre Dame.
tt Professor of Law, Villanova School of Law. A.B. 1952, Northeastern
University; LL.B. 1954, Boston College.
1. Lord Hewart, C.J., Rex v. Sussex Justices, ex parte McCarthy [1924]
1 K.B. 256, 259. See also Denning, L.J., Schooley v. Nye [1950] 1 K.B. 335,
345. Accord: Atkin, L.J., Shrager v. Basil Dighton Ltd. [1924] 1 K.B. 274,
284: "Next to the tribunal being in fact impartial is the importance of its appearing so."
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abstraction "justice" then those hot after it or away from it and
especially those who make it their business or who under its broad,
inclusive blindfold pursue the next best thing, order, should be considered as they are so limned.
That the lawyer has not appeared in the best of possible lights
whether literary or other, is something of a commonplace, especially
to the lawyer who has perhaps ruminated over literary pieces generally
considered among the classics. Not only is justice far from the concern
of a sizeable proportion of the men of law -

and the law itself

-

as

they have often been pictured, but even minimal order in the most
temporary of temporal situations has been outside their purview. In
Chaucer's eye, and in Shakespeare's, few were above malfeasance of
one degree or another; many were beneath contempt. "First lets kill
all the lawyers." 2 In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries the
criticisms were unsparing. Jonson's Mosca relates the sentiments of
his master (and perhaps his creator) as he encourages Voltore to
buy a legacy:
I oft have heard him say how he admir'd
Men of your large profession, that could speak
To every cause, and things mere contraries,
Till they were hoarse again, yet all be law;
That, with most quick agility, could turn,
And return; make knots, and undo them;
Give forked counsel; take provoking gold
On either hand, and put it up; these men
He knew, would thrive with their humility.3
And Swift's denunciamento, with less economy but more venom,
deepens the shadows in which walked the advocate; explaining the
customs of irrational man to the consummately rational houyhnhnms,
Gulliver offers an example of the lawyer's art:
If my Neighbor hath a mind to my Cow, he hires a Lawyer to
prove that he ought to have my Cow from me. I must then hire
another to defend my Right; it being against all Rules of Law
that any Man should be allowed to speak for himself. Now in this
Case, I who am the true Owner lie under two great Disadvantages.
First, my Lawyer being practiced almost from his Cradle in
defending Falshood; is quite out of his Element when he would
be an Advocate for Justice, which as an Office unnatural, he
always attempts with great Awkwardness, if not with Ill-will.
The second Disadvantage is, that my Lawyer must proceed with
great Caution; Or else he will be reprimanded by the Judges and
2. KI NG HENRY VI, Second Part, IV, 2.

3.

VOLPON4,

I, iii, 52-60.
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abhorred by his Brethren, as one who would lessen the Practice
of the Law. And therefore I have but two Methods to preserve
my Cow. The first is, to gain over my Adversary's Lawyer with
a double Fee; who will then betray his Client, by insinuating that
he hath Justice on his Side. The second Way is for my Lawyer
to make my Cause appear as unjust as he can; by allowing
the Cow to belong to my Adversary; and this if it be skilfully
done, will certainly bespeak the Favour of the Bench.
The judges "lie under such fatal Necessity of favouring Fraud, Perjury
and Oppression," and rely on "all the Decisions formerly made against
common Justice," which, "under the Name of Precedents, they produce
as Authorities to justify the most iniquitous Opinions." Criminal
cases are much more easily handled than are civil: "The Judge first
sends to sound the Disposition of those in Power; after which he can
easily hang or save the Criminal, strictly perserving all the Forms of
Law." Bench and bar, of course, proceed in a "cant and jargon" that
perpetuates the profession.4
It is small wonder that during the nineteenth century the lawyer
found difficulty in gaining respectable recognition "in a society which
had never regarded lawyers of any description with over-much favor.
None of the commercial and technical professions thrown up by the
Industrial Revolution had to overcome such prejudice or so many
difficulties." 5 The literary disparagement of the profession did not
lessen out of a sympathy for the plight of lawyers. Lamb supposed that
"Lawyers must have been children once," and Dickens' delineations
of the law's delays and outright inequity, as well as the perfidy of
lawyers, were to prove more popular in the public mind than the legal
reforms they postdated, except to those actually involved in litigation.
If Scott was pleased with the company of barristers and thought highly
of them, their portrait is not sufficiently colorful in his work to
brighten the profession's reputation against his successor's grimer
estimate. Jarndyce -

vs. -

Jarndyce, from Bleak House, has become

the classic "case" of jurisprudential absurdity: the trust is diminished
by inflation and administrative costs, and finally is extinguished by
the attempt at judicial remedy. Substantive justice cannot emerge
even if it is at all desired from any quarter - out of the morass of
procedural niceties, the accretion of centuries, the darling of conservatives, the burden of humanity.' Evidence rules and common law practice and procedure are similarly enshrined in Bardwell v. Pickwick,
4. SwrP, GULLIVER's TRAVELS 215-17 (Norton Critical Ed. 1961).
5. BIRKS, GENTLEMEN Or THE LAW 270 (1960).
6. Used as a classic example of what equity ought not become in ScoTT
SIMPSON,

CASES AND OTHER MATERIALS ON CIVIL PROCEDURE

184 (1950).
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and the lawyer struggling for public approbation through Law Society
and parliamentary reform measures, and, more importantly, personal
probity, could not and did not compete successfully with the anachronistic but compelling portrait of his profession as Dickens vitriolically
presented it.'
Many of man's perennial conflicts escape altogether the recognition
of the courts, fortunately, but many others are within at least the
theoretical concern of the judicial process, whether litigation results
or not. As populations burgeoned and urbanization proliferated and
compounded in the last century, the very congestion of humanity made
the incidence of conflict higher, and brought within the terms of party
conflict those crises that in other ages had less of a public manifestation.
At the same time the novel as a literary form came to maturity and
social manners - or better, society - was its subject. It was perhaps
inevitable that writers would turn to law, lawyers, and litigation for
at least part of their material. After Scott and Dickens,' Surtees,9
Trollope,' ° Warren" and Thackeray 2 may come to mind as having
focused on areas of experience or patterns of life touching, touched by,
or existing through the law. In 1908, Wigmore published a list of
some novels that in one way or another reflected the legal world; the
vast majority of his titles were, of course, from the last century."3
And during the early years of this century, that fine scholar and
humanist, Judge John Marshal Gest, published a series of articles,
later collected as The Lawyer in Literature, in which he examined
7. Holdworth, The Case of Bardwell v. Pickwick as an Historical Document,
13 IowA L. Rev. 61, 61-62 (1927): "The reason why not only Pickwick, but also
many of the novels of Dickens are of information to the antiquarian or the legal
historian is to be found in the dates when they appeared, or the dates at which
their scene was laid. Dickens was born in 1812 and the dates of his novels range
from 1835 to 1870, so that in many cases the scene of these novels is laid before
the era of the law reform of the nineteenth century had begun. Thus Pickwick set
out on his travels in 1827 and the book was written in 1836. Hence, in Dickens'
descriptions of the courts, the lawyers, and the law of his day we get an account
of the many archaisms which still existed in the English law. That is one reason
why so many of Dickens' books are useful to the legal historian. Another reason
is this: Dickens had an extraordinary power of minute and accurate observation;
and because of his early training he applied this law to the law and lawyers. At
the age of twelve he visited his father who had been imprisoned for debt in the
Marshalsea prison and this left an indelible impression on his mind. At the age
of fifteen he was in the office of Charles Molloy, and was later in the office of
Ellis and Blackmore. He was a reporter in the courts of Chancery and Doctor's
Commons at the age of eighteen; and in 1899 he had been the victorious plaintiff
in five chancery actions against certain publishers who had printed some of his
books."
8. See GxsT, TH4 LAWYER IN LITERATURE 1-112 (1913).
9. Gutteridge, The Law and Lawyers of Jorrocks, 8 CAMB. L.J. 161 (1943).
10. WINDOLPE,

REFLECTIONS OP THP LAW IN

LITERATURE

11 (1956).

11. Watt, Samuel Warren, 30 JURID. Rv. 85 (1918).
12. Silliman, Thackery and the Law, 18 CAS. AND COM. 423 (1912).
13. Wigmore, A List of Legal Novels, 2 ILL. L. Rv. 574 (1908).
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some notable British and continental novelists who treated to a greater
or lesser degree the lives, problems, practices and institutions of law
and lawyers. 4 His account of the image of his subjects in the dramatic
terms of certain novels was limited, however, both in scope and technique; most noticeably absent was the law and the lawyer in American
literature. Both literary and legal scholarship would have benefited
had the Judge turned to his native literature.
Because Dickens "did not kill the Chancery snake, but only
jumped on it after it was dead,"' 5 because Scott and Stevenson wrote
largely of remote legal systems and because the nineteenth century was
the nineteenth, the caustic or comic or even vaguely sympathetic accounts of law and lawyers in literature of that century are often treated
as fictional entertainment (which they are) without any more relevance than historians can find in them (which is not inconsiderable)."
The question of their influence upon what might be called the political
acceptance of the rule of law is regarded as mooted by the diminishing
returns of time. And in a stately waltz with such an attitude goes the
perennial exhortation, often by gracefully literate members of the
Royal Bench, to the lawyer to indulge himself in what, after all, should
be the "equipment of the lawyer."' 7 Whether the same aloofness can
be displayed toward literature since Wigmore catalogued and categorized the more obvious "legal" novels is doubtful, however, since
the image of the law and the encounter with the law coincide. Wigmore
was more than a cataloguer when he urged the lawyer "because of his
special professional duty to familiarize himself with those features of
his profession which have been taken up into general thought and
literature." The literary dimensions of the image of the lawyer - the
"features of his profession" - as they have emerged since Wigmore
refined his list from 382 titles to 100 in 1922,8 can be considered
worth the especial attention of the lawyer in his professional capacity
as they are part of the context in which he carries on his craft
or sullen art.
Some attempts have recently been made to focus the attention of
the lawyer upon his fictional counterpart who is emerging in the contemporary context in which the lawyer is practicing. William H.
Davenport, a professor of English who directed a course in legal
literature at the University of Southern California, has published a
14. See supra,note 8.
15. Ibid. at 30.

16. See supra,note 7.
17. Birkett, Law and Literature: The Equipment of the Lawyer, 36 A.B.A.J.

891 (1950).
18. Wigmore, A List of One Hundred Legal Novels, 17 ILL.. L. Riv. 26, 28
(1922).
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bibliography and supplement of readings that note prominently the
recent fiction centering on lawyers or legal problems ;9 A. P. Blaustein,
who is much concerned about the public stance of lawyers, has edited
a collection of short stories ;2o and Judge Harold Medina has selected
and introduced a passel of Authur Train's stories. 2' Specifically concerned with the portraiture of his colleagues in very recently published
novels, Edward J. Bander, at the time the Librarian for the Court of
Appeals in Boston, has attacked a handful of writers for "the arbitrary,
pretentious, impossible manner in which they portrary the law and its
servants," the "cumulative effect" of which "has been agonizing to the
poor conscientious day-to-day practitioner." The "subliminal vilification of the law and lawyers by present-day novelists" dismays him
mightily, almost as much as does the fact that they sell well.22 In short,
the lawyer is exhorted to an awareness of his uncommissioned and
even undesired public relations portrait.
Bander's dismay is, interestingly, prompted chiefly by the prevalence of sexual promiscuity on the part of the fictional lawyers of,
among others, Cozzens (By Love Possessed), R. P. Powell (The
Philadelphian), Louis Auchincloss (The Great World and Timothy
Colt), Mankiewicz (Trial), and O'Hara (10 North Frederick). Only
Travers (Anatomy of a Murder) escapes on this account since at least
his hero never involves his women in "a non-legal posture" (the phrase
defeats Bander's complaint that the book is "tedious with wisecracks"),
though rape and murder sustain the plot, in his judgment. The aims
of the literary characters, as lawyers, their professional commitment
and competence, and the legal order in which they exist and color or
further by their role - all are largely ignored. Only Mankiewicz'
professor, duped by Communists, and Cozzens' Tuttle, touching the
trust funds, are singled out for attention on grounds other than
promiscuity. Bander wishes on other professions the fictionists'
mordant eye, since he (rightly) observes that laciviousness and greed
are not the special and exclusive property of lawyers.
What remains unexplored, however, is the degree to which the
law and its servants are vilified as an institution and a professional
group of a society. If the lawyer as lecherous man is given prominence,
this in itself will have little weight for a public that, as Bander admits,
has come to expect of all men that they be troubled by the imperious
19. Davenport, Readings in Legal Literature, 41 A.B.A.J. 939 (1955) ; Readings

in Legal Literature: A Bibliographical Supplement, 43 A.B.A.J. 813 (1957). See
also: A Course in Literature for Law Students, 6 J.L. Ed. 569, 573 (1954).
20. FICTION Goes To COURT (1954).
21. MR. Tuvr AT His BeST (1961).
22. Bander, Some Legal Fiction: Woe Unto You, Novelistsi 45 A.B.A.J. 925
(1959).
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demands of the flesh. The fictional representation of men succumbing
to those demands may or may not be literarily valuable, but the presence of such material in itself hardly subsumes the interest or the
impact of the text as a literary or a social document."8 It might then
be profitable to explore some of the modern fiction that has made an
impact upon the public with specific regard to the lineaments of the
profession of law and the legal order that it projects, directly and
indirectly, overtly and covertly. Certainly the novels of Cozzens and
Travers are especially deserving of analysis, since they long enjoyed a
handsome reception from the public; and mention too should be made
of Gardner's ubiquitious hero of a thousand legal battles, as well as of
that embodiment of the Yankee archetype, Mr. Tutt, who entertained
the readers of one of America's most popular magazines. The primary
levels of literary enterprise of any pretention are represented in such a
selection, and the probability is increased that the configurations of
the public image of the law and the lawyer as literature (under a
fairly loose definition) reveals them will be encountered.2 4
Cozzens has for many years been familiar to lawyers for his 1942
novel, The Just and Unjust, a book which rather quickly was recognized as a valuable aid to the neophyte law student and so gained a
place on a list of recommended readings prepared by the Harvard
Law Faculty.2 5 All the reasons for the inclusion of that novel are no
longer discoverable perhaps, but reviewers in and out of law journals
were especially impressed by the degree of "realism" afforded by the
novel's scenes of courtroom drama.26 Indeed, the virtues of the work
were presumably epitomized in the close correspondence of the murder
trial of the unjust and a Pennsylvania County (Bucks) Court proceeding. There is, of course, much truth in such a view of the book.
The authenticity of details in scene and procedure are marked, and the
dramatic excitement inherent in a struggle between intelligent men
over a question of great importance - the life or death of the defendants - is conveyed successfully over the course of the novel.
23. See FIEDLER, LovE AND DEATH IN THE AMERICAN NOVEL (1960), for his
observations on the relation of the novel and sexual love; it is, in Fiedler's estimation, a weakness of fiction in America that adult passion is almost never encountered; but cf, FULLER, MAN IN MODERN FICTION 32-44 (1958).
24. Faulkner certainly represents another level, but his novels and stories
presenting the lawyer Stevens are not his most significant work, nor have they
had the popularity of those pieces of fiction to be considered here.
25. Note, 58 HARV. L. REv. 589 (1945). This piece bears the title: "A List of
Books For Prospective Law Students Now in Service Prepared by a Committee of
the Faculty of Harvard Law School."
26. Ibid. at 593: "The best account in fiction of the daily life of ordinary lawyers.
It tells what really happens in office-work and trials." See also: Davenport, A
Course in Literature for Law Students, 6 J.L. Ed. 569, 573 (1954).
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An unsavory bunch have, so one of their number confesses, committed a kidnap-murder of another unsavory character, and, following
a mixture of coincidences and inevitabilities, two are brought to trial
while a third testifies for the state. Almost immediately a contrast
is struck between the backgrounds of the defendants and those of the
officers of the court (Judge, prosecutors, defense counsel), a contrast
orchestrated by the very physical settings of the novel. The defendants,
like the victim (a dope peddler), are outlanders from the teeming and
corrupt metropolis; they have spent their not lengthy lives on the make,
creating their unimpressive values as they went, grasping at the main
chance, which is never much, in a pattern of animal cunning liberally
adulterated by human stupidity. They have no family, no roots, no
respectability, and though the specific charges of the indictment are
the guides to the realities sought by the court contest, the gravity of
the charges and the atmosphere of the novel are weighted by rules
other than those of evidence. The court, beginning with the abstraction
presented on the docket and moving through careful procedures and
safeguards to an ultimate declaration of another abstraction (guilty or
not guilty), is entertaining an action the dramatis personae of which
are foreign in every respect but one: their presence is a command
performance through the statutory provision giving Quarter Sessions
jurisdiction over the felony committed within the county; moreover,
the felony is uncommon in the court, a decade having passed since the
last murder trial. The violent and the seamy are equally strange and
discomfiting in the setting marked by the symbols of age, stability,
and repose.
Unlike the defendants and victim, the officers of the court are
members of the establishment; some have long family histories in the
semi-rural area, while others, though newer arrivals, have accepted
and married into the standards of decorum and value of the older
families. It would not be literally correct to denominate the "just"
as the white, Anglo-Saxon, Protestant ascendency, but it would be
sufficiently accurate. Abner Coates, the central figure in the novel, is
son and grandson of county judges who have presided where he now
prosecutes as Assistant District Attorney. Only recently out of Harvard Law (where he was classmate with his lifelong friend, the defense
counsel, Harry Wurts), he is beginning his community service that
presumably will someday be performed on the Bench before which he
now argues. Club, church, school, and a network of social and blood
lines define him (and, more or less, the other officers of the court)
and set him off starkly from those whom he prosecutes, much more
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starkly than does the aisle between prosecution and defense tables. But
as he shares in a measure the responsibility of the District Attorney,
he must by his professional commitment come to an understanding of
those intrusions upon the peace of the community and of the institutions whereby the peace is preserved or restored; and the attempt to
reach that understanding obliges him to evaluate, however uncertainly,
the estate of manhood or maturity and to grow into it. The conflict
within the young man is that within the young man of any community,
aboriginal or "advanced": initiation into full adult status involves the
acceptance of forms, the inhibition of certain impulses, the quiescence
of certain doubts, the grasp of complex and sometimes conflicting
aspects of reality in a framework of what is at least nominally a rational
order. And if the society into which the youth fully enters as adult
is to be preserved, the reconciliation between youthful dreams and
mature evaluation of circumstances must be achieved with neither too
violent a rupture from the adolescent hopes nor too shocking a revelation of disparity between raw fact and the rationale that presumes to
explain the fact.
Abner Coates, witnessing the ritual re-enactment of a threat to the
ordered world he has always known - a re-enactment sans the violence
that does at least momentarily shatter the society by nullifying its aims
for one member, the victim of the crime - is thrown upon his resources
of family and community training to assimilate, even in the abstracted
form in which the court allows it, the horror that crime is. And with
the details of the kidnap-murder there is also revealed a constellation
of other abuses to man: a confession has allegedly been beaten out of
one defendant by the FBI. The confession, which would restore more
quickly the order of the community, is therefore desirable evidence, an
approach to truth and rationality; but it is at the same time paradoxically undesirable, for the conditions under which it was obtained
by an organization standing for the rational order of society might
prejudice a jury and defeat the purposes of the ritual. Hence, while
truth is sought, the whole truth of a situation contains an affective force
disturbing to the repose that the rational consideration of truth seeks.
Meanwhile a high school teacher admits voyeurism in a summary proceeding from which truth is partially and deliberately excluded.
Reason strains the reasonable order on other respects: the District
Attorney is anxious for success in this case, not only because he is
convinced of the prosecution's construct, but also because his personal
advancement may depend on it; and Abner in turn is due for promotion
if his chief leaves vacant the office. But as the possibly alogical
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jury can be prejudiced by some kinds of testimony and thus within

the framework of reason conclude with something other than a logical
formulation, so the officer who is to marshall the materials that will
lead such people to a logical conclusion is himself subject to them in
their role as electors. Members of the establishment in Bucks County
in 1939 (as in 1961) are Republicans; indeed, Republicanism is (within the novel at least) synonymous with a decent income, a decent club,
decent relatives, and decent membership in a church (or, if the term
is not redundant, a decent church). But there enters a dark presence
upon all this decency - the county chairman, whose job, unappreciated
by young Coates, is to select the candidates for office that will symbolize
full membership in the establishment. The master of initiation ceremonies must know the temper of the tribe, what it will and will not
accept, and who will accept membership in the right spirit. For Coates,
this is the intrusion of the all too human element in the abstract
construct he has latently formed of justice, competence, decency,
and deserts, and hence he rebels. Unfortunately for the romance of
rationalism, the chairman does not expect the candidate to sign secret
protocols immunizing road contractors who cheat on concrete quality,
overcharge the treasurer, and contribute to the party from the unearned surplus; in ironical fact, the chairman is willing to accept a
doubtfully reasonable choice by Coates for Assistant District Attorney.
The crisis of the conflict is reached when Abner, his contacts
with complex experience enlarged, enriches his life with an acceptance
of the irreducible tension that marks successful civilization. Cozzens
doles out the embarrassments to the dream of reason in a pattern that
culminates with the absurd verdict of guilty of second-degree murder
for the two defendants - a verdict that is the apparent negation of
the logic of the evidence and is an abomination to judges and prosecutors; and a further irony compounds this since the state's witness,
who, it was hoped, would aid the return to order and in turn be
rewarded by a more lenient sentence after his own trial, is now left
in the regrettably unambiguous position of the publicly confessed
accomplice to a capital crime. It is an unreasonable verdict, but reason
can justify it, or consider it in such terms that the fact will not display
too egregious an instance of unconformity. Abner's father, the old
Judge now debilitated by physical infirmity but still capable of commanding community respect and allegience, offers the explanation:
the rule of law (like the existence of an aristocracy) is to a degree
dependent on popular acquiescence. The jury is a buffer between the
official embodiment of the rule and the masses ruled; and it absorbs
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discontent - or rather unfocuses it and reflects it back upon the discontented - and hence leaves unperturbed the rule. All that is required
for the successful continuation ad infinitum of the rule of law by the
logical, and hence fit, is the ability (which is a sign of fitness) to
recognize the need and inevitability of the illogical manifestation at
intervals. This is the frailty of man, the human condition; and those
who rise above it do so by recognizing and tolerating it, for that is the
sine qua non of management and the quintessence of reason.
The lesson of initiation to the elite is precisely that the elite direct
the great unwashed through the troubles that their temporary (drinkinduced) or permanent (congenital or natural) unreasonableness invariably create. The sign of election is not necessarily freedom from
the passions that debilitate, but at least the common sense and perspective to avoid the infirmities when the tribe is in conclave assembled.
For the unitiated are largely incapable of either grasping the
mysteries or of tolerating a marked deviation from the proprieties by
those who presumably have grasped them. Cozzens pictures the unwashed through the eyes of the elite, of course, and hence there is a
built-in preference, or, from the other side, pejorativeness, in the
image of those who are not called to the Bar; yet there is more than
that, there is a positive cumulative emphasis on the stupidity of the
vast majority of men. Indeed, the "analogical matrix"2 of the account
of those who must come to the lawyers can perhaps best be summed
up in the term "boneheadedness." Folly, only slightly adulterated by
faint and indirect intuitions of justice or kindness, is the enduring
characteristic of mankind - folly, selfishness, and sometimes, or oftentimes, viciousness; only a few select are free from a natural disposition
(intellectual and moral) to misconstrue, distort, or destroy, and the
folly of those few would be to fail to see the weakness of others.
Abner Coates must come to the towering wisdom that reason's
ultimate apotheosis is that reason is seldom encountered, and then only
in a few. His desire for a logical ordering of humanity's endeavors
may be commendable, but his expectation is not. There is a difference
between theory and practice, both the District Attorney and experience
tell him, and he cannot have things his own way, rational and orderly,
as long as his "own terms' t do not include a settled conviction of the
refractoriness of most of that disagreeable species, homo sapiens; and
the paradox of the truth is in the irony of the name. Hence when
Abner recites to his father his father's own maxim, Ex factor oritur
27. MARK SCHORiR, Fiction and the "Analogical Matrix" CRITIQUg AND ESSAYS
ON MODtRN FICTION, 1920-51, 83-98 (Fd. Aldridge 1952). Schorer borrowed the
phrase from Scott Buchanan, and employs it to examine three nineteenth century
novelists; the term and the concept are helpful here, however.
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jus, he is already beginning to understand that keeping the facts

straight means manipulating them: he has on that very day had to
abuse the sensibilities of one of his own witnesses so that the defense
in the murder trial would not create successfully an impression that
the witness was an expert on something closely related to the expertise
for which he was called to testify for the state in the first place; and he
has been obliged to commit what might be called "misprison of misdemeanor" in dealing with an incompetent Justice of the Peace, thus at
once defeating the desirable end of levering the squire out of office,
abusing the District Attorney's trust, and more and worse, justifying
the means by the end. But in all this he is approaching what his father,
in the closing words of the novel, calls the duty of the elite, to do the
"impossible." Abner's habit of analysis of every gesture and statement
remains, presumably, with him, and that is his virtue and warrant as
a member of the elite; but he is perhaps less inclined to formulate his
analyses in terms of the disjunctive propositions, so much the habit of
the rationalist more aware of Lord Hardwicke's aphorism about law
and certainty (which Cozzens uses as an epigraph to the novel) than
of Justice Holmes' reservations on law and logic. Abner has by the
novel's end come to terms with the County Chairman, whom he
formerly regarded with semi-polite contempt because he had no
authority or justification "in law." And he has received a lecture and
a lesson from one of the oldest members of the Bar, who reminds him
that in the name of common sense the rigid formalities are sometimes
transcended or subverted.
Interestingly, it is lawyers who transcend the law in the interests
of common sense; the untrained, like the farmer turned Justice of the
Peace, whom Abner saves from his incompetence, are liable or even
likely to go creating havoc in their attempt to circumvent the formalities. The "impossible" is to be achieved by the elite; for them the
faults and follies as well as the formalities will be minimized: "...
I
can say that I'm glad I spent my life in the law," his father tells
Abner; ".

.

. there are disappointments; there are things that seem

stupid, or not right. But they don't matter much. It's the stronghold
of what reason men ever get around to using. You ought to be proud
to hold it. A man can defend himself there." The lawyer recognizes
the stupidity of mankind, comments on it freely, at least among his
colleagues, and even obliges others to unwillingly assume a posture of
stupidity or incompetence, as the coroner is forced to do in the testimony about the cause of death in the murder trial. Too, Abner can
recall "certain professors," "men of great learning and wisdom" who
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"none the less sought and enjoyed the poor and mean sport of traducing the stupid." Though they are professors of law, they are other
than lawyers managing the affairs of a working world, and hence, it
would seem, their cocksureness was explained by their remoteness from
life. The remarks of the defense counsel Harry Wurts that prompt
the recollection of the professors might seem to place, in Abner's
estimation, his colleague outside the pale; and indeed Harry skirts
the edge of the establishment, almost, because his tactics are "cheap" in
the eyes of the District Attorney, becoming one of the unwashed who
has deliberately defiled himself. Harry has been, however, introduced to
the mysteries, and manipulates the unreasonable by his own reason
until it fits a pattern he and the other lawyers can tolerate; he at least
seeks the approbation of the "just" and in that escapes the censure
Abner silently delivers on the "shyster" Servadai who deliberately
seeks by reason the unreasonable end of avoiding justice. Servadai is
the renagade, as well as the "foreigner," the intelligent man corrupted,
the lawyer who ignores the ideals of the profession, who seeks not the
"impossible" - the fusion under tension of the real and the ideal but rather the possible - the further corruption of frail man. In short,
the subversion of the law by lawyers is acceptable as it is in the interests
of transcending by and for common sense the formalities of law; the
subversion that has only the subversion or gross pecuniary rewards
as its end is contemptible and not really of the law.
To declare, after Virgil, Sunt lacrymae rerum, is but the first or the last - step in constructing a philosophy; it is hardly a philosophy
itself, and it can be no more than a pedantic form of such pieces of
cracker-barrel homiletics as "Life is one damn thing after another," or
"If something bad can happen, it will," or "Things will get worse
before they get better." Cozzens, of course, is not creating a philosophy
but is recreating an experience, dramatically, that both embodies and
reveals an attitude toward experience, a particular and even peculiar
vision of experience. The novel is a linguistic construct with various
conformities to its referant, or non-conformities, and it is possible to
disparage Cozzens' attitude, to disagree with certain observations of
his characters, and even to find fault with his law (though that is
perhaps the least impeachable aspect of the novel) without thereby
condemning the novel per se. The broad pattern of attitudes through
Cozzens' work may seem pessimistic or even cynical to some, and certainly undeserving of the dignified title of philosophy. But the attitudes
are mature in so far as they are dramatically presented: the pseudo-life
portrait that his novels present have a valuable correspondence in and
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to the society he observes, however thin or "shrill" some of his obiter
dicta about society may be when he speaks outside of the novel. 28
The novelist has presented a compelling drama of the role of the lawyer
in his professional milieu, of the tangled skein of society that endures
because some -

the lawyers -

without expecting much do what

can be done to enable man to escape some of the more serious consequences of his passions or to avoid the action consequent upon passion
or to correct the situations that the frailty of man will bring to pass.
The lawyer broods over the New Jerusalem and recognizes it as no
better than the Old; but he has a very limited notion of his messianic
role, for he will not die in sorrow nor live in joy nor preach to its
reformation, but, aware of limitations and inevitable if unforeseeable
entanglements and of his partial frailty (only relatively less than the
rest of mankind's), he will rise to the day's job of work of preservation of the modest level of civilization the community has, not crying
himself, whatever are the tears of things, because men don't.
John Ward makes the point, persuasively, that Cozzens is not
interested in the lawyer as such, but in the professional man who,
better than others, realizes the disparity between the ideal and the
actual.29 But in the two novels following The Just and the Unjust
the lawyer figures large, and as Coates had to realize the separation of
theory and practice and come to assume a responsible attitude by
assuming responsibility, and thus achieve manhood and preserve
society, so the lawyers of Guard of Honor and By Love Possessed
come to reaffirm the truth they had earlier known of the limitations of
hope and will and reason, and go on to reinstitute the modest order
and sanity that the passions of frail man have disturbed; and it is the
law, and the lawyer's training and experience, that are the instrumentalities for the restoration. It would not be unreasonable, then,
to infer that for Cozzens the lawyer and the law are preeminently the
professional and the profession that makes sense, in however modest
a degree, out of life. The lawyer and the law make the human condition
as bearable as it can be made - or ought to be made for that matter,
since some other agencies, such as the Catholic Church, may make
life bearable at the expense of human dignity, as Judge Coates puts it
in The Just and the Unjust and Mrs. Pratt exemplifies it in By
Love Possessed."'
28. Ward, James Gould Cozzens and the Condition of Modern Man, 27 THE
(1957-58).
29. Ibid. 94-95.
30. For a somewhat different perspective see: McKernan, Profile of an
Aristocrat: James Gould Cozzens, 186 THE CATHOLIC WORLD 114 (1957); 'Finn,
Cozzens Dispossessed, 68 COMMONWEAL 11 (1958).
AMERICAN SCHOLAR 92, 98
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The Pulitzer Prize Novel Guard of Honor (1948) exemplifies
this position especially in that the setting is a military base, rather
than the courtroom, and the problems emerge and are categorized
and manipulated in terms other than those used in litigation. The
fabric of life on a military base, despite the stereotype, is not unlike
that elsewhere, especially as Cozzens portrays it; there is no simplified
table of organization, no single and infallible source of wisdom, no
absence of the rub or clash of interests or personalities, no exclusion
of the passions and frailties of man - and no utter assurance that
from a set of facts or actions or hopes will spring a definite, calculable
consequence. The actors are military men of the ostensible military
establishment; but the setting is wartime, and the officer class has been
augmented by the presence of men from all sorts of callings or accidental occupations. Hence the unity of purpose in the society and its
aristocracy-by-happenstance is artificial, superimposed rather than integral and organic. The military code, the officer tradition, even the
elan of war cannot themselves serve sufficiently to order such a society
or keep it from its centrifugal diffusion. The exacerbations of a history
of racial discord, the importunings of sexual desire, the jealousies of
the ambitious and the resentments of the incompetent, all these confront
and threaten the explicit purpose of the base. The professional military
man has too limited a vision, too short a perspective, to accomplish the
accommodation of forces; his competence is not with the enmeshes
of society but with one of its gestures.
Colonel Ross, however, has a lifetime behind him of dealing with the intransigent and incalculable; his competence is of
the order of Judge Coates', and he is himself a judge. Over
the last three days of a week he holds together the necessary if
artificial society of the Air Base, bringing reason to bear, the
wisdom that experience has taught, and the specific talents of the
lawyer and judge. It perhaps is an overstatement to say he alone holds
the base together; a confluence of chance and intention from a variety
of sources is involved; but it is Ross' disposition of what it is in his
power to dispose that is decisive. His is the reasonableness and common sense that recognizes limitations and frustrations and knows that
they are the matter of life and not simply the matter with life. His
anger is like that of Marty Bunting, the District Attorney of The
Just and the Unjust, a sign of frailty but also a sign that the frailty is
about to succumb to reason. Reason is not assured triumph, but success
is not to be measured by conclusive ends or unadulterated joys;
reasonableness is the recognition of an ideal of order and the impossi-
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bility of it, the thoughtful manipulation of forces and the accommodation of that which is beyond manipulation. The paradox of maturity
painfully achieved by Abner Coates is the once more proved property
of Ross: reason is the recognition that reason is not the sum of man
and cannot be but must be pursued though it cannot be attained. The
race for the prize struck Abner Coates as a bit of fraud, since only one
can win and the rest race in vain; but the race is called for the elderly
as well as for the schoolboy ("no bets are off" as Judge Coates tells
Abner, in another context, but one applicable to Guard of Honor) and
if the prize is of another order and the conditions different the race
must still be run, with the desire but without the hope of winning.
Realism is not the denial of purpose and effort because the race cannot
be won by all; it is running hard with the knowledge of the impossibility of complete success. Judge Ross brings the lawyer's competence
and training to bear in keeping the business of the base going: the
Executive Officer is incapable of giving detailed attention to his work,
so Ross must do it for him; and that is running the race, even if
walking is the nearest thing to running. The day's work must be done,
and whether love or hate or stupidity would bray loudly for the sun
to stop, it will not. The lawyer achieves the "impossible" of watching
the sun go down with a willingness to get up the next day, just as the
sun will; he has not resolved the ills of man, he has devoted his intelligence and training to keeping them from renting the fabric of life so
thoroughly that nothing recognizable is left but naked man.
Trial advocacy, the function that has given the barrister esteem
of a higher sort than his perhaps better trained fellow lawyer, the
soliciter, attracts the public eye more easily than does the routine of
counseling and negotiating on the myriad matters that make up the
day's work.3 So a paradox is discovered in the choice of subjects on
which Cozzens chooses to focus: the image of competence working
without dramatics and with a contempt for melodrama is fashioned
invariably with materials inherently dramatic and bordering on the
melodramatic. If the greatest art conceals art, then Cozzens ranks
rather high among artists of language, for he submerges the raw,
unfinished, melodramatic aspects of his material to allow the signifi31. BIRKs, GENTLEMtN OP THE LAW 3 (1960) : "[The barrister] must . . . spend
the first year of his professional life as the pupil of an experienced member of his
profession. .

.

. As the newly admitted solicitor is turned loose on the public at

large, these examinations are far more searching than the barrister's." LERNER,
AMERICA AS A CIVILIZATION 433 (1957) : "The dramatic expression of the government
monopoly of force is the criminal law. From the most sordid and banal cases of
most routine pickpocketing and prostitution in the police courts to the most sensational murder cases, the criminal law gives to the lives of bored and lonely Americans
some fillip of distraction."
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cance of his characters' actions to emerge dramatically, and that significance or thematic meaning is a denial of the romance of life as other
than a fiction. Flamboyance, a la Harry Wurts in cross examination
or Abner Coates in a moral pose that is to strike Harry into sobriety,
is distasteful: but the flamboyant must appear to be distasteful, or a
tract and not a novel is the result. Ross does the impossible of achieving
the possible after passions have disrupted the community in a situation made dramatic by the distillation of the melodramatic.
The process is found again in By Love Possessed, wherein the
fusion of a style and a set of interrelated subjects produces another
avatar of the lawyer doing the mending and refurbishing and modest
incrementing of the civilization. Fornication, alleged rape, suicide, betrayal, and fraud are part of this fictive world, as was murder, violence,
and voyeurism part of The Just and the Unjust. But these elements are
not subsumptive of interest; they are part and not the whole of the
recreated experience of the novel. The day's work is done in repairing,
or letting alone if repair is only a species of more melodramatic violence,
the results of flamboyance, exuberance, anger, lust, hate, greed,
stupidity, sentimentality, or even mis-directed good will. Cozzens has
taken the chance of eschewing the minimal stylistic flare of the previous
two novels and the ready-made theatric scene of the court-room, but
his drama nevertheless compells and enforces the portrait of the lawyer
and the law as the establishment preserving the minimal cohesion
of values.
Arthur Winner, Jr., (in whose name is found the first irony of
the novel) is caught by time and place and actions of others and of
his own desire "in a disturbance of self-questioning, in the vagueness
of regretful uncertainty." His partner Julius Penrose, crippled in body
but quick in mind (Swiftian, indeed, were the pun permissible),
provides a catalyst to the ruminations Winner endures or entertains
upon the trap that is the life dominated by "capital F Feeling" wherein
the lusts and imbecilities and the calculated cruelties conspire against
reason. Winner has had his hopes dashed in all respects; a son blazed
a path of violence and disregard, making a shambles of the pattern for
him that a father consciously or unconsciously projected; one wife,
who did not sufficiently absorb his attention or his passion, has died;
and he has been an adulterer with Penrose's wife, and has not successfully kept it from Penrose. Belief in the efficacy of religion has eroded,
but he has been asked to become senior warden of his church. His
secretary's brother is accused of rape by one girl and of fornication
and bastardy by another - and is both innocent and guilty at once
of both matters - a combination of calamities that prompts the

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1961

17

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 6, Iss. 4 [1961], Art. 1

VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 6: p. 451

secretary to commit suicide. And finally the senior partner of the
firm of Tuttle, Winner, and Penrose, the ancient and respected Noah
Tuttle, is discovered by the junior partners to have juggled trust
funds. There is no escape, no retreat; in the corner of the garden is
the snake whose head can be neatly severed for an ultimate final, conclusive victory, but the external world of nature is not the human
nature of Winner or the people of Brocton.
Winner must accept the clotted, convoluted character of experience and experience's actors, including himself, and make what he can
of them without indulging in a dream of perfection. A life as a lawyer
has given him the equipment necessary for minimizing the chaos of
passion; an eye used to the deceits that truth enjoys, a faculty for
analysis of motives, and a competence at organizing disparite facts;
all that is required is a patience with limitations, one's own as well as
others, and the law and the lawyer have that too. Winner and Penrose
decide to leave undisclosed the manipulations of Tuttle; perhaps in
time the accounts will settle up, and in any event only further destruction can result from disclosure.5 2 It is not, however, the connivance
of those who seek to negate justice; nor is Tuttle's manipulations of
accounts for his own monetary gain. Rather, it is the agreement of
the men of reason to acquiesce in an appearance of stability instead
of insisting on a course of logic that will make the real more intolerable;
after all, Tuttle acted out of a sentimental regard for society that
faced financial ruin when he first began to shift funds, and hence though Tuttle's regard could be equated with self-love - the mature
judgment must accommodate the peccadilloes and tolerate the aberrances that have a stabilizing effect. Men must work and not weep
over a past of faulty historical imagination or a future of an overactive imagination.
Those who weep or rage are possessed by love; they would
obliterate the present, the here-and-now, in favor of the interiority
of their supposedly timeless selves. But there is a fatal error in that
assumption of a significance of the self without regard for the conditions that bind it: regarding the self sub specie aeternitatis is to
make, as Penrose puts it, a bet about something there is no verifiable
human knowledge of, and hence to call the incalculable into human
calculations. Cozzens' characters are of the eighteenth century in
disposition, but without the hope of a heavenly city or of the perfectability of man; perhaps Montaigne. offers a better prototype since he
32. Winner is of the mind that he and Penrose will be accessories after the
fact by failing to reveal Tuttle's actions, and Penrose believes that they, or at least
Winner, will be civilly liable. But see Gould, By Love Possessed: A Review From
a Legal Point of View, 44 A.B.A.J. 731 (1958).
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could even better accommodate the scurrilities and obscenities of
experience within a view of man than could, say, Montesquieu or Swift
or Franklin, and of course far better than the utopian philosophes.
Montaigne would have appreciated the observation of Penrose that
"An entrance is won to the heart; but to the head? Passion and
reason, self-division's cause! . . . On people as people, I try never

to pass judgment - we can seldom know what the real truth about
them is. Yet on acts, acts of theirs, I see no reason to hesitate in
passing judgment - this is good; this is bad; this is mean; this is
kind. On such points, I'm competent, as every man is. Like the common law, we secular moralists aren't interested in the why; we observe
the what." The only strange feature to the sixteenth century skeptic
would have been the reference to the common law; that Cozzens has
carried into the picture, for, as it has been built up out of accumulated
need and experience, it has, for Cozzens and his fictional lawyers at
least, a proper perspective on man, an attention to the present, and a
long view about the insufficiency of the ordinary run of mankind.
The "unlovely world-as-it-is" is best managed by those on bench and
bar who know the futility of laboring over what might have been, and
who know that what might be is liable to be unpleasant and so are
cautious about prescription. If this leaves men like Judge Dealy or
lawyer Penrose also sardonic, it does not necessarily result in contempt for endurance in the face of the strong probability of failure;
and a milder attitude than the caustic mein of Penrose and Dealy is
found in some lawyers, especially in Winner. But all are men of
reason, 4ttempting to strike the balance of stability against the destructive mystery of passion, and the law is the instrument they find most
effective and properly fexible for such an undertaking. Again, the
highest reason for the secular moralist is the recognition that reason is
not all, but is all that can be counted on in a confrontation with the
wild uninhibited propensities of the mass of mankind. It is a reasonableness somewhat removed from that of Paul, who observed: "I see
another law in my members striving against the law of my mind;"
and a concept of law even farther removed, since Cozzens finds no
absolutes but those painfully shaky norms of the temporal order, the
more precious and deserving of concern because they are shaky.
A composite portrait can be found through the Cozzens' novels of
the law as the symbol of resilient temporal order, the flexible shape
of desirable human interrelations; and the lawyer as the hierarch who
mediates the process of shaping and who creates the shape. The law
looks to the realities of complex, tormented man through the eyes of
the lawyer and thereby finds its standards and calls or forces men to
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them. The long perspective of the law is possible only in so far as the
lawyer can have perspective, and he can have it only with age (forty
years are needed for a man to become an adult, Arthur Winner
suspects). The norms that the law sets or the conduct it inspires,
enjoins, or requires are based on the cumulative experience of society
as its rational members evaluate that experience; certainly no norms
are found beyond the verifiable temporal need of society, and none are
regarded as having a sanction other than their reasonableness. Law
derived from either hope or revelation is wish-law, ultimately unfounded on nature and probably at variance with it. On the other
hand the positive law, if it is not mindlessly arbitrary, will be fairly
enduring, not because things do not change but because when they
do there is no assurance it will be for the better, and a flexibility will
be built in if the law is the instrument of lawyers rather than the
ukases of those who have their eyes on a heavenly city. The law is
the rational ordering of the irrational, turbulent, whining, confused,
passionate hoards, the barbarians who are cajoled or forced into the
better but not best of worlds.8 3 If the "thrusts of fate" as well as the
stupidities of man are within the ken of the reasonable man, then
flexibility will be right and proper; and yet that flexibility will not be
a mark of inadequacy of the law, a failure of the principle of equality
before the law, but rather a sign of the shrewdness of the ministers
and makers of the law. "The law, nothing but reason, took judicial
notice of man's nature, of how far his conscience could guide him
against his interest. For the sake of others, for his own sake, the law
would not lef him be led into temptation. In its wisdom, the law only
aimed at certainty, could not, did not, really hope to hit there. This
science, as inexact as medicine, must do its justice with the imprecision
of wisdom, the pragmatism of a long, a mighty experience. Those
balances were to weigh, not what was just in general, but what might
be just between these actual adversaries." Such is Winner's final reaffirmation, a reflection of Judge Coates', and presumably it is Cozzens'.
Here attention should fall on the meaning of the image the
novelist has skillfully developed through a style effectively and perhaps
affectedly, suggesting the choked, clotted, interpenetrating, ramifying
and reverting nature of experience. The terms "reason," "man's
nature," "conscience," and "interest," as well as "wisdom" and
"science," lead to considerations of a sort more abstract than the
immediate, concrete experiences of the novel. Those abstractions for
Cozzens may or may not be at a remove from the instant pattern of
33.

OLIVtCRONA,

LAW AS FACT 136 (1939)

: "Men need

taming in order to live

peacefully together."
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embodied idea, feeling and act that makes up his fiction, but for the
reader they may well be the residue in memory's filtration of the particular, remaining after the details of rape, seduction, suicide and
parodic religiosity have wasted; the individuality of the scene and its
people may fade, but the symbolic content persevere. The implicit
subsumption by "law" of the semantic radius of all terms referring
to significant human endeavor, the highest levels of both physical and
psychic experience, make Cozzens' cumulative image of the law extraordinarily impressive.
The crucial point in the affectiveness and effectiveness of Cozzens'
projection of the law and the lawyer is not likely to be found in the
acceptability of his conception of man as a closely circumscribed being,
whose experiences, whether personal or public, can be framed and
understood by legal phraseology or parallel analogies. It is presumably
possible to agree with a von Hardenburg on the excellence of the
revelations of the night, or with, say, D. H. Lawrence on the wellsprings of valuable experience, and yet be impressed with the concentrated image Cozzens develops. That is, the careful structuring of
the fiction, with the evident contemporaneity of his scenes and his
idiom, the authenticity of his reportage, and the subtle way in which
he suggests that while life and art are distinct, his portraits are not
art but life itself, give his work vitality and an authority that quiet
doubts about a disparity between his view and the readers' philosophic
attitudes. The city that the writer disparages may be the ganglia of a
greater complexity of experience than is offered in the parochial
settings of Childerstown or Brocton; the sources of power and influence
over the lives of people may be and are found in their widest forms elsewhere than in the practice of such a firm as Tuttle, Winner, and
Penrose or of a District Attorney's office in a fifth class county; yet
the novelist quiets those doubts by making his subjects paradigms
of whatever else is encountered and wherever else it occurs. C. P.
Snow's Lewis Eliot may have a wider range for activity and the
exercise of power, and Camus' lawyer-narrator of The Fall may probe
recesses of depravity that shade those Winner suffers, but of the three
novelists it is Cozzens who makes the pattern of legal activity the conceptual framework for the experiences he deals with, and legal terminology the means of understanding them.
Cozzens' lawyers and the law that they live and administer are
together, then, the custodians of value. The lawyer, like Winner, may
be weak like other men, but is also stronger; his failings are not
remedied by search into the mysteries of man but by a rational acceptance that failings will be encountered and mysteries observed, and
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both can be overcome or supported or managed by the institutional
power structure, the law. The exploration of the justification of the
form the law has will lead in a circle back to the faculty that attempts
the exploration - the reason of the lawyer. This is only a very short
step from the conclusion that the lawyer has erected the law to preserve
his cultural patterns and psychological disposition, that his reason
rationalizes what is beyond reason, that the norm of human existence
is what is done by him who controls the instrument of power. But
that step is not taken. The theory of jurisprudencial norms is subject
to the same ironies that man is; as man does not reach certainty in the
construction of his life, but at best a tolerable condition that permits
his continuation in life, so he does not explain fully the source for
sanctioning conduct. 4 Reason, too, is limited, and to be held suspect
even as it is employed. Hence it appreciates the irrational yearnings
of man, just as the law accommodates them, even as it refuses them
honor. A cultural history, epitomized in the legal structure, has given
the one standard for evaluation: the culture has a civilization that still
survives to support it. Success is endurance, excellence is durability;
and a working system ought not be tampered with radically. The
lawyer keeps the system working.
Such a modest goal, so little removed from a parody of conservatism or a jurisprudence of stagnation, makes Cozzens' lawyers
unlikely candidates for roles in the perennial American drama of success, a drama that aims at triumph unadulterated by skeptical reflection
or the expectation of renewal. Irony may be everyone's lot, but it is
not savored by everyone. The taste of victory will fade in time; .it
ought not in the mouth be sensed as wormwood. The popularity of
ideological slogans8" indicates a habit of mind uncongenial to the
notion of limitation in the handling of controversies, and hence there
is no little surprise in the long popular success of By Love Possessed
(unless the careful rehearsal of an alleged rape explains it). On the
other hand, those portraits of the lawyer that represent him in uncompromised victory, final and irreversible and, better, just, under
every man's garden variety of jurisprudence, can be expected to nestle
into public esteem quite easily. The lawyer-as-hero in a controlled
context of human problems has recently been exploited without the
subtleties of implication that Cozzens enjoins. Especially successful has
been Judge Voelker of the Michigan Supreme Court in finding the
formula for rescuing the lawyer from the latent suspicions of the
34. See POUND, AN INTRODUCTION TO THZ PIHILosoPHY o LAW 47 (Yale
Paperbound 1959).
35. See Irving Kristol, Old Truths and the New Conservatism, 47 YALE RzviEw
365-73 (1958). BELL, THE END OF lDEoLOGY 369-75 (1960).
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popular mind"' without violating the expectation that the hero will
solve irrevocably a situation.
Travers' Anatomy of a Murder dissociates the law from the
lawyer, the triumph from the complications, and the theme from any
existential relevance. Centering on the trial of an Army officer charged
with the murder of his wife's brutal rapist, Anatomy portrays the
intricate manipulations of the materials of evidence by the defense
attorney, Paul Biegler. In the tradition of the "gallus-snapping"
country lawyer, Biegler practices in a rural area (the Upper Peninsula
of Michigan) where the refinements of dress and expression are affectations rather than symbols of civilized attitudes. Having been chosen
for the defense because the foremost criminal lawyer of the area is ill,
Biegler, a one-time District Attorney now running for Congress, sees
his function not in terms of the preservation of forms of society or
even as a search for justice but as an opportunity to advance his
personal cause. This suggests that once again the lawyer is emerging
in the disparaging terms of the older tradition, earlier recapitulated;
but Travers has avoided that by the materials of his trial.
The murder victim has committed a felony, one peculiarly odious
and destructive of order. The murderer has at the very least a justification in folk-sentiment; the problem is to find a justification in law
that will be sufficient to convince the jury that the killing has not
destroyed the order postulated and upheld by the statutes. The former
district attorney has a curiously difficult time in hitting on the mode
of defense that can prevail: temporary insanity, coupled with the right
of citizen arrest and the permissible possession of firearms by military
personnel. The symbols of order and stability so attractive to Cozzens
are almost deliberately disparaged by Travers, who focuses instead on
the rough-hewn, latent good will of the jury-members for his source of
consolation in the battle. The law is not a historically developed framework for the transmission of values and amenable, reasonable practices, but a number of individual statutes and decisions to be exploited
for an individually determined, isolated end. And the lawyer is the
entrepreneur of the endeavor, free-wheeling and irresponsible. The
struggle of conscience is foreign, not because Biegler has no conscience
but because his is so fashioned as to permit him to see his legal acts
36. See, for example, an article Careers in the Law, CHANGING TIMES, THE
August 1960, p. 42: "Besides, lawyers are thought to be

KIPLINGER MAGAZINE,

immersed in pettifoggery. As one jurist puts it, the man in the street believes that
'lawyers are more astute for fees than justice and more absorbed with techicalities
than with human concerns.'" See also Hand, The Deficiencies of Trails to Reach the
Heart of the Matter, 3 LEcTua s ON LEGAL Topics 89, 105 (1926): "I must say
that, as a litigant, I should dread a law suit beyond almost anything short of sickness and death."
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in isolation from a context of interrelated moral demands. Hence he
can speculate about the dangers of questions that may lead to an
admission of guilt of first degree murder, which of course would
destroy a defense proposal. Expertise in the law is a combination of
energy in research and shrewdness in the "lecture" and cross-examination. An associate, Parnell McCarthy, devoted to his profession, "the
jealous mistress of the law," when sober, provides the research, while
Biegler, who regrets he, like the rest of the bar, is "getting to be a fine,
colorless, soft-shoe breed, something like a cross between a claims
adjuster and an ulcerated public accountant," supplies the cleverness,
the tactical deployment of evidence aiming at a desired conclusion,
indifferently truth. The trial itself is akin to Kriegspiel, a form of
semi-controlled manipulation of pieces, the ultimate potential of
which is never disclosed except in the failure of a gambit. A jurisprudence of gamesmanship evidently constitutes the meaning of the
"law" in Travers' book, and the lawyer is the gamester.
It is a lively and engaging game that the novelist plays, and
Justice Voelker, a former District Attorney himself, has obviously
parlayed the drama with authenticity of detail and an engaging sense
of humor. But authentic detail and a comicality turning on contemporary inanities cannot rescue the work from its thinness of theme
and its stereotypic characterization. Hollywood has provided him with
a frame of reference for categorizing the action and actors he has
created, and it is legitimate foil for contemporary satire. But Travers
has been governed by that which he would mildly ridicule: he has
created a script with all the limitations that he has subjected to abusive
asides. His hero is a man of generally good will, fair intellect, passable
stamina, and commonplace tastes. His triumph is different in degree
but not in kind from that of the simplistic hero of American popular
tradition: he has come up against odds and has overcome them; no
complexity in human aspiration or disposition is involved and no
reflection is offered on the subtler significance of either the crime or
the effort of society to comprehend and neutralize the violence. Society
is trying to "save face" Biegler observes, but the implications of this
are exhausted in the saying. It is not the state that is the villian (the
political position of the hero negates the possibility of that traditional
feature) but the state's attorney, Claude Dancer, who is outfitted in
the habiliments and gestures of traditional villainy. Biegler has turned
back a not-awe-inspiring juggernaut much as the western hero upsets
the foul designs of the territory's biggest ranch-hopper or the railroad
speculator's agent. He is virile if middle-aged, given to outdoor sports,
and competent within the needs of his vision. However, the cumula-
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tive effect of his fictional passage is modestly insignificant; the image
that lingers is of the law and its procedures as a grab bag of isolated
items, and the lawyer its chief customer; what he draws out may
transform the fact-finding process of the trial into a carnival rich in
distractions. That Biegler finds the "surprises" of the practice of law
one of its attractions is not in itself surprising; the element of surprise
is one of the features of authenticity, but for the approach to the truth
of a situation or conflict the aspect of surprise is a limitation lacking
in attractiveness." The introduction of doubt has its legitimate function, but doubt as a goal is curious and possibly it is a vicious limitation on a serious endeavor. The courtroom is for Travers' hero the
central locus of colorful, vital activity, and yet the author has made
this colorful precisely as a circus is. The legerdemain of the lawyer,
pious asides notwithstanding, is his virtue; and if Biegler is in the
tradition of the hero in some superficial respects, he has also the
character of the hero of an inconsequential game. It is the difference
between Kriegspiel and Krieg.

The concept of justice does not enter the considerations of Biegler,
but its presence, however vague, distinguishes the central characters
of two other lawyer-novelists from those of Travers. The late Arthur
Train and the flourishing Earle Stanley Gardner have provided what
are possibly the dominant popular prototypes of fictional lawyers.
Train, an assistant District Attorney in New York, contributed, chiefly
to the Saturday Evening Post, dozens of tales centering on Mr. Tutt,

a lively if aging yankee lawyer adroit in moving both safely within
and questionably without the law. Tall and spare, Ephraim Tutt calls
to mind by speech and act the shrewd New England peddler whose
mythical life Constance Rourke chronicaled ;88 but he has been resurrected in the earlier twentieth century, educated, and given a special
competence in the law. Maneuvering so freely that due process and the
common law are effectually his personal implements - however
authentic Train's details - Mr. Tutt works out a pattern of justice in
the affairs of his clients and friends. Juries may be accidentally influenced3" or intentionally misled 40 ; judges may be blackmailed4 ' or
37. Speaking of the trial courts Jerome Frank observed: "Absent there is the
stratospheric hush. Such a courtroom is, as Wigmore notes, 'a place of ... distracting
episodes, and sensational surprises.' The drama there, full of interruptions, is
turbulently conducted, punctuated by constant clashes between counsel and witnesses
or between counsel." FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND XXVi (1949).
38. ROURKE, AMERICAN HUMOR: A STUDY O THE NATIONAL CHARACTER 18-36
(Anchor ed. 1953).
39. TRAIN, The Human Element, MR. TUTT AT His BEST 1-23 (1961).
40. "Mr. Tutt, Take the Stand!" Ibid., 115-33.
41. His Honor, The Judge, Ibid., 343-57.
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litigants may be hounded by something approaching barratry 42 ; obscure
points of procedure and rules of evidence may be dredged up 43 or
outrageous but legal conduct perpetrated by him44 - but in all instances
Tutt seeks the morally acceptable and even desirable result. He stands
free of the weaknesses of the law, omnicompetent to employ the very
failings to his chosen ends. Judge Harold Medina in his introduction
relates the long admiration he has had for Train's fictional character:
".. . he represents the ideal of what lawyers and those who are not
lawyers think lawyers ought to do. Above all he has a sense of humor,
and with it a tenderness and a kindliness that go well with his profound
knowledge of the law and his wily ways and strategems."
The similarities of Mr. Tutt and Travers' Biegler are apparent of
course. Both rove rather freely across the legal landscape, and each is
capable of striking a pose or upsetting the decorum of the law. But
Train has created a somewhat antiquated Robin Hood, sometimes sentimentally and naively, while Travers has settled for the hero manque,
if with more verve and wit in the portrayal. Both implicitly deny the
rather exhalted role of law that Cozzens delineates, Travers by ridiculing the pretenses of form, Train by ignoring the heuristic qualities of
the very tentativeness that Cozzens sees as a sign of maturity and realistic stability. In an imperfect world certainty is unlikely, all three would
agree; but whereas Cozzens finds the law the symbol of the limited
success man has had, Travers presents the law as an arena for personal
triumph and Train presents it as something to be suddenly refashioned
or adjusted if the good end demands it. It is interesting in this regard
to note that Train once published an autobiography of Ephraim Tutt,
which was greeted with some dismay in the law journal reviews;
there was a tendency to consider Tutt a shyster.4 The appeal Tutt
had for the layman, however, was more nearly that which Judge
Medina grasped, for the stories were perennially read with no registered outrage.
More famous than Tutt is the fictional lawyer pre-eminent,
Gardner's Perry Mason. In sharp constrast to Tutt's Yankee lineaments and New York practice, Mason is as informal in manner as his
city, Los Angeles, is. Gardner, more prolific under his proper and
various pseudo-nyms than even the energetic Train, has parlayed a
42. You're Another! Ibid., 303-23.
43. The Meanest Man, Ibid., 134-61.
44. Mr. Tutt Stages a Rodeo, Ibid., 324-42.
45. Ibid., Introduction,xii, xiii.
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character into an institution, an overriding public image. Mason, like
Tutt, is hot after justice, and forms are no more of a barrier to him
than they ought to be. He is perhaps a detective more than a lawyer,
for his practice in criminal law is not defense so much as attack. The
adage revered by defense counsel, that, after proposing a faulty alibi,
the worst thing counsel can do for his client is to attempt to prosecute
another party, apparently has little weight with Gardner, for Mason
clears his client by trapping the guilty. The courtroom is the scene of
the verbal gymnastics wherein the confession is extracted after a fatal
slip on which the agile lawyer can pounce. In scores of such romances
of dialectical derring-do, Gardner has forged the myth of the legal
savior, the foremost candidate to succeed the western hero of the
range. The values Mason espouses are as unarticulated as the plots
are involved; all the intricacy leads to the last minute rescue of the
hapless defendant. This is not to say that justice is nothing, but it is
certainly an unexplored concept, a simple abstraction, in Gardner's
novels, to which a mechanical application of the instant case is made.
The law is simply the courtroom procedure, and, fortunately for Mason,
the jurisdiction has sufficiently loose rules that he can employ the
latitude required for his own success. Action is involved, but character
is hardly complex. The theatrics of the confrontation of the guilty and
the implacable attorney absorb the interest, while questions of meaning
are mooted.
The American authors are not innocent, of course, of distortions,
any more than they are of literary failings. Certainly Train, Gtrdner,
and Travers in erecting substitutes for the Horatio Alger hero, or for
the western individualist of our national mythological pantheon, have
had the success possible to those who pander to but mediocre intelligence and taste; theirs are stereotypes whose projection incurs the
expense of any meaningful insights, and in whom interest is confined
almost solely to the question of their reflection of the profession of
law. Wigmore considered Train a successor to Fielding, a judgment
best understood as a form of fraternal courtesy, and one never elsewhere proposed ;41 and no one has suggested as much even in courtesy
for Gardner or Travers. But the popularity of their fictional characters
perhaps suggests something about their audience. Their lawyers escape
the limitations of rule and bureaucracy, limitations that necessarily
become more imposing as society becomes more complex or at least
46. Wigmore, A List of One Hundred Legal Novels, 17 ILL. L. Rzv. 26, 34

(1922).
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more numerous. The cowboy, 47 the aviator, 48 and now the lawyer
have appeared to symbolize the longed-for independence of the individual; the mythical figure has been the product of and productive
of contradictions, but that has not destroyed his viability or the appetite
for his appearance. The lawyer now enjoys something of a respite
from the literary attacks formerly made upon him, a respite that may
or may not last. He may find in popular literature his visage present
because some of his activity is inescapably dramatic or can be made
to appear so, but he may not appear an adequate symbol of a popular
aspiration. Society, after all, will not follow Thoreau's advice to disestablish itself and any approach to reality in fiction will have to
indicate the involvement of at least the criminal lawyer's efforts.
Cozzens may be indicating the way in which the lawyer will
appear in more serious literature. His concern is with the texture of
society and his lawyers knit society together and help preserve its
values. He hypostatizes the law in one sense, giving it a role that no
authoritarian ever even wildly hoped his edicts would have, that
religionists hoped but knew their beliefs would not have, and that
Arnold, in the decline of religious influence, asserted poetry should
have. But since his law is neither the "brooding omnipresence in the
sky," nor simply the corpus of positive guides to conduct, but a pragmatic, reasonably flexible, humanely administered attempt to solve
difficulties and to reflect the needs of civilization, as they are determined by the lawyers, the men of reason, there is an ameliorating
aspect to his law. It is unfortunate that Cozzens' men of reason, his
elite, at times appear to be latter day incarnations of the elite defined
by another lawyer, Ward McAllister, a century ago; that they are
content with "supporting mysteries" rather than investigating them;
that the power they control is the instrument of increasing the pathos
of some lives, though Cozzens apparently regards that pathos as the
inescapable tragedy of the human situation. His lawyers, are, however, questioners of some things if not of mysteries, they are "secular
moralists" and not immoralists, they are aware of the irony of their
own pretentions; and in fiction and fact they are both more reassuring
and more attractive than messiahs for those who would rather preserve
a situation chary of comfort than experiment. The law has its delays
in Cozzens' work, but nothing in his fiction could match the delays of
the law in fact. In all, his fiction represents a literary gain of immense
SMITH, VIRGIN LAND 99-125 (Vintage ed. 1957).
48. WARD, The Meaning of Lindberg's Flight, STUDIES IN AMERICAN

47.

CULTURE

27-40 (Ed. Kwiat and Turpie 1960).
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proportions for the public image of the lawyer and the law, one corresponding to the image an eminent jurist recently proposed: "The
Anglo-American system of law is based not upon transcendental revelation but upon the conscience of the society ascertained as best it may
be by a tribunal disciplined for the task and environed by the best
safeguards for disinterestedness and detachment.""
49. Bartkus v. Illinois, 79 S. Ct. 676, 680 (1959). Compare; Cozzens, Notes
on A Difficulty Of Law By One Unlearned in It, 1 BucKs COUNTY LAW REPORTER
302 (1952): "As an admiring lay observer, I have always considered that W.S.
Gilbert's Lord Chancellor, when he declared that the law is the true embodiment
of everything that's excellent, stated no more than the truth. If it has a single
fault or flaw, I lay that to the unfortunate intrusion of the human element - a
fallibility and unreasonableness of mankind that enters to disturb the law's own
august order of right and reason. This, I think, the law itself feels. In its
accumulated wisdom, work of the best minds for many centuries, the law moves and not without resource and dexterity - to minimize the damage men can do
its processes by being men."
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